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COMMENT
COST ALLOCATION IN TITLE VII
REMEDIES: WHO PAYS FOR PAST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION?
I.

INTRODUCTION

The past decade has seen the rise of a variety of "affirmative
action" programs designed to increase the participation of minorities and women in job categories and educational institutions
that were previously closed or at least partially closed to them.
These programs have been much publicized,' though their effectiveness in significantly changing the relative economic position
or altering the available options of minorities and women as
classes is open to question.2
There is evidence that we may have reached a kind of turning
point-or at least a point of reevaluation-in the use of affirmative action schemes as a significant tool against racism and sexism. There has been opposition to affirmative action from its
inception and uneasiness about its implications, particularly its
potential impact on nonminority and/or mae peers.3 However,
with relaxation of the mass social pressures of the 1960's, with
heightened competition for scarce resources during the economic
downturn of recent years,4 with increased organization of various
forces opposing either the basic assumptions or practical applica1. See, e.g., N. GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION (1975).
2. For a summary historical description of black employment trends, including an analysis of the fact that the overall income gap between black and
white families has widened in the seventies, see Edwards, Race Discrimination
in Employment: What Price Equality?, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 572. For data on trends
for women workers, see U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. WORKING
WOMEN: A CHARTEOOK (1975).
3. One celebrated case that highlighted such opposition was DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). For a complete record of the case, see DEFUNIS
v, ODEGAARD AND THE UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, THE UNivERSY ADMISSIONS
CASE: THE RECORD (A. Ginger ed. 1974). See also KRAFT, DEFUNIS V. ODEGAARD-RACE, MERIT, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1976).

4. See, e.g., the layoff cases discussed in note 64 infra. See generally Black,
Civil Rights in Times of Economic Stress-Jurisprudentialand Philosophic
Aspects, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 559.
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tions of affirmative action programs,3 and with signs from the
Supreme Court that it may be ready to tackle some of the issues
that litigants on both sides have been pressing for years,' the
challenge to affirmative action appears to have reached a critical
point.
A key element in this crisis, both inside and outside the
courtroom, is the attempt to define what is basically fair to the
white and/or male competitor who, because of his sex or race,
suddenly finds himself "dispreferred'" for a desired job opening,
promotion, or admissions slot. The expressed concern for fairness
to the dispreferred individual is central to the policy arguments
of those challenging affirmative action programs. Thus, it may
prove crucial to the survival of such programs to find remedies
that could minimize the adverse impact upon dispreferred individuals. These remedies should, however, recognize the legitimacy of the struggle to eliminate discrimination in an aggressive
and consistent way.
This comment will describe the beginnings of a search for
remedies in the area of employment discrimination. It will trace
a brief history of the use of preferential remedies, particularly
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' It will then discuss
5. These forces include elements as diverse as the lobby against ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment, the Anti-Defamation League, and Ivy
League college presidents restive under the burden of affirmative action conditions imposed on federal funding to higher education.
6. See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976)
(preliminary print) (whites can claim racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §
1981 (1970)); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (preliminary print) (new
standard for determining whether employment test is discriminatory under fifth
amendment); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (competitive
"fictional" seniority granted to discriminatee); Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 97
S. Ct. 1098 (1977) (challenge to medical school special admissions program).
7. Paul Brest has suggested three categories of people affected by affirmative action preferential remedies: the "preferred" individual, who is the immediate beneficiary of the plan; the "dispreferred," who is in direct competition with
the beneficiary for a scarce resource; and the "nonpreferred," who is not directly
affected by the plan but might be equally entitled to the resource. Brest, The
Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Forward: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination
Principle,90 HARV. L. Rxv. 1, 36 (1976).
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The Act makes
it unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor union "to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
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the possible emergence of a "burden-sharing" approach to Title
VII remedial preferences, whereby the cost of a remedy would be
shifted at least to some extent from the prior victim and the
presently dispreferred employee to the discriminatory employer.
It will end with an examination of the recent lower federal court
decision in McAleer v. AT&T which imposes such a remedy, and
an evaluation of its strengths and weaknesses.o

II.

HISTORY

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted in response to the
massive pressure of a broad-based and militant civil rights movement,' at a time when overt discrimination and racial segregaor privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,

sex, or national origin." Id. § 2000e-2 (1970).
Employment discrimination suits may also be brought under 42 U.S.C. § §
1981 & 1983 (1970), but courts have tended to apply Title VII analysis to such
claims as well. Compare Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir.
1972), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3263 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1976) (No. 76-344)
(traditional fourteenth amendment analysis), with Bridgeport Guardians, Inc.
v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, subsequent
appeal, 497 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975) (Title VII
analysis). The recent Supreme Court case of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976) (preliminary print), drew a distinction between the tests to be employed
for a finding of discrimination under sections 1981 and 1983 and those used in
Title VII cases. The implications of this distinction for future divergent treatment of the statutes are not clear. The Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)
(1970), is another available federal tool in some cases of sex discrimination, but
it has a different history and thrust. See, e.g., Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421
F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
9. 416 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1976).
10. A somewhat parallel response from the executive branch soon followed
when President Johnson signed Executive Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 169 (1974),
reprinted in 42 U.S.C. app. § 2000e (1970 & Supp. V 1975), which prohibited
discrimination in employment by government contractors, with enforcement
responsibility in the Secretary of Labor. This comment will focus primarily on
Title VII, although Executive order cases are also relevant. The history of available remedies under the Executive order has closely tracked that of Title VII,
and it is not unusual to find a case involving both. See, e.g., EEOC v. AT&T,
419 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
11. The Act was basically aimed at discrimination on the basis of race,
not gender. Opponents included sex in the list of prohibited discriminatory
classifications in Title VII in hope that such inclusion would block its passage.
See 110 CONG. REc. 2577-84 (1964) for an enlightening glimpse at some of the
varying congressional attitudes toward sex discrimination at the time. An un-
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tion 2 were still widespread and candid. 3 Many of the most overt
forms of racial discrimination, including those in the employment
sphere covered by Title VII, disappeared relatively quickly under
the new law. Employers who had not already seen the handwriting on the wall acted-often under court order, sometimes voluntarily-to end the practice of maintaining separate (and unequal)
departments and lines of progression for blacks and whites." Unions merged formerly segregated locals. 5 But litigants were soon
confronting the courts and enforcement agencies with the fact
that while employers and unions were generally following practices racially neutral on their face, the problems of minorities in
gaining access to and security in previously closed job areas were
as grave and unyielding as ever. In many instances, the effects of
prior discrimination were being carried over directly into the new
"colorblind" systems. A typical example is the case of firms that
ended segregation in lines of progression and began allowing
black employees to transfer from previously all-black into previously all-white departments, but nevertheless retained the old
departmental or job form of seniority. This new system required
a transferring black to forfeit his or her previously accumulated
seniority and begin at the bottom of the ladder in the new department, with less protection from layoff than white workers who
might have greater departmental but lesser plantwide seniority
than he or she."'
ravelling and reweaving of the sex and race threads of Title VII litigation is
beyond the scope of this comment. The bulk of the analysis that follows is
applicable to both kinds of cases, although there is some divergence.
12. See generally 1.R. lp. No. 914, 88th Cong., tst Sess. (1964),
reprinted in EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII & XI oF CIVIL RIGHTs ACT
OF 1964, at 2122-53 (1968) [hereinafter cited as EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
13. See, e.g., Thornton v. East Tex. Motor Freight, 497 F.2d 416 (6th Cir.

1974) (trucking industry practice of separate departments for city and over-theroad drivers); Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980
(5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970) (paper industry); Quarles v.
Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968) (tobacco industry).
14. See, e.g., English v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 465 F.2d 43 (5th Cir.
1972).
15. See, e.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir,),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976) (preliminary print).
16. The Supreme Court voiced its concern for this type of carryover discrimination in a case involving the use of employment tests. Noting the effect
on black applicants of longtime inferior education in segregated North Carolina
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Another pattern that emerged was employment practices
that systematically excluded minorities and women because of
the cumulative effect of general societal disadvantages borne by
those groups, or because of cultural differences between them and
the mainstream. Typical of this pattern was the imposition of
special educational requirements or tests for hiring and promo7
tion.
Faced with these realities and taking the view that Title VII
required more visible results, courts began imposing
"preferential" remedies, measures that favored members of the
previously discriminated-against class. At times these decisions
took the form of approving plans imposed or negotiated by relevant government agencies;" other remedies were devised by the
courts themselves, usually only when they were convinced that
there was no effective alternative., '
Some of these preferential awards were in the form of "makewhole" remedies running to individual victims of demonstrated
schools, the Court enjoined the use of tests and requirements that excluded a
disproportionate number of women or minorities unless the employer could
demonstrate that they were job-related. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
431 (1971). In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Court
held that Griggs had been "rightly concerned that childhood deficiencies in the
education and background of minority citizens, resulting from forces beyond
their control, not be allowed to work a cumulative and invidious burden on such
citizens for the remainder of their lives." Id. at 806. But see Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (preliminary print) (applying different standard to
tests challenged under fifth amendment than to those under Title VII).
17. E.g., Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.
1971).
18. See, e.g., Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc),
in which a divided court reluctantly imposed a temporary hiring quota on the
Mississippi Highway Patrol, remarking:
Experience since the entry of this decree provides this Court on rehearing with the hindsight to determine what was fathomed by foresight in
the dissent from the panel opinion: the relief ordered by the District
Court is insufficient. When this case was heard by the original panel
in June 1972, the Highway Patrol had four black patrolmen. By the
time the case was heard by the en banc Court in October, 1973, there
were six black patrolmen-six black patrolmen hired since entry of the
decree during a period when 91 patrolmen were added to a total force
of approximately 500 troopers.
Id. at 1055.
19. 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
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discrimination. Thus in Local 189, United Papermakersv.United
0 the court ordered that blacks transferring
States,"
into previously
all-white departments be allowed to exercise their plantwide seniority within their new departments despite the fact that this
would alter the seniority rights of incumbent whites. The black
workers were direct victims of the former discriminatory system,
and the court reasoned that each should be slotted into his
"rightful place"'" in the seniority ladder-the place he arguably
would have occupied had it not been for the discrimination.
Other preferential remedies ran to the disadvantaged group
as a whole. Courts ordered hiring ratios for employers = and ordered some craft unions to start referring certain numbers of minority workers for jobs,3 thus imposing remedies that would ben20. Id. at 988. The "rightful place" doctrine was first articulated in an
influential law review article, Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination,and the
Incumbent Negro, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1260 (1967). The article set up "rightful
place" as a mean between alternate approaches dubbed "freedom now" and
"status quo."
21. E.g., Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 950 (1972); United States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 532
(W.D.N.C. 1971).
22. E.g., Rios v. Enterprises Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d
Cir. 1974); Vogler v. McCarty, Inc., 451 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1971).
23. Although it may be difficult for professionals to appreciate the importance of seniority to nonprofessional employees, it is a crucial aspect of workplace
life. It serves as protection for workers in their later years when their ability to
compete in the labor market has eroded. It also serves as a similar shield against
favoritism and arbitrary treatment at the hands of management. The degree to
which the "seniority principle" has been secured at present varies widely, of
course, and it has been achieved only through hard-fought battles by unions and
rank-and-file workers. The fact that seniority can also function as a position of
privilege should not obscure the fact that unions and workers are legitimately
and naturally wary of encroachments on seniority systems. They are aware that
management may try to take advantage of any erosions in the system, and are
not always assured that antidiscrimination agency staffs, for instance, are sensitive to union concerns. For a union view, see Fischer, Seniority is Healthy, 27
LAB. L.J. 497 (1976). A recent case that begins to address some of the problems
of the union's responsibilities and rights in a Title VII situation is Myers v.
Gilman Paper Corp., 544 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1977), in which the court balanced
the legitimacy of a union-negotiated antidiscrimination plan against one
reached by the company with minority group representatives. The whole area
is filled with contradictions and uncertainties. The extent to which a union has
an affirmative duty to fight discrimination or is barred from doing so by its
"conflicting" obligations to the majority is still unresolved. See id. (affirmative
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efit minority applicants irrespective of a particular discriminatory incident between the employer or union and a given applicant in the past.
Predictably these preferences ran into stiff opposition from
unions whose seniority arrangements were violated by the orders,
and from majority applicants and employees whose chances of
hiring and promotion were curtailed or whose job security was
eroded. 4 Opponents of the preferences fought them in a variety
of ways. They argued that the preferential remedies were unconstitutional as violative of equal protection and due process.2 They
argued that such remedies violated several provisions of Title VII
itself: first, its general proscription of discrimination against any
individual because of his or her race or sex; 2 ' second, its clause
specifically protecting practices based on "bona fide" seniority
system;" and third, its assurance that no preferential treatment
to correct numerical imbalance would be required. 8 In some cases
the remedies were attacked as breaches of collective bargaining
duty); Communications Workers v. New York Tel. Co., 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
509 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (union not allowed to represent complaining female discriminatees because of its dual membership). The extent to which a union should
be held jointly liable for employer discrimination is another difficult issue. See
generally Interational Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 1843, 1874
(1977), vacating and remanding United States v. TIME-DC, Inc., 517 F.2d 299
(5th Cir. 1975).
24. The same basic arguments as those advanced against Title VII remedies were pressed against preferences imposed pursuant to Executive Order No.
11,246, note 10 supra.
25. E~g., Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 950 (1972).
26. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970). For text,
see note 8 supra.
27. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970), states:
"lilt shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply
different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges
The
of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system ......
Supreme Court explicitly put this objection to remedial grants of constructive
seniority to rest in Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). See
notes 87-92 infra and accompanying text.
28. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970), states:
"Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer . . . to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group

because of the race, color, religion, sex or national origin of such individual or
group on account of an imbalance which may exist . ..

.
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agreements on the ground that they interfered with established
seniority systems.2 Generally, the courts have resolved these arguments in favor of the remedial preferences.' While the constitutional issues involved in "reverse discrimination" appear to be
far from settled,1 to date courts have found little difficulty in
holding preferential employment remedies constitutional2
Considerably more judicial effort has gone into evaluating
the provisions of Title VII itself'3 to see if they prohibit preferential remedies. Opponents of these remedies have frequently relied
on the Act's legislative history, which, although ambiguous, does
reveal a distinct antipathy on the part of many members of Congress toward preferential treatment for discriminateesY1 Never29. E.g., Savannah Printing Specialties, Local 604 v. Union Camp Corp.,
350 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Ga. 1972).
30. For a well-ordered list of challenges rejected, see EEOC v. AT&T, 419
F. Supp. 1022, 1040-56 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
31. For differing judicial views on the subject of special admissions to
professional schools, see DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); Bakke v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976),
cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1098 (1977); Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, 39
N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d 537, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976), noted in 16 WASHBURN L.J.
190 (1976). One area of discussion among the commentators is whether a benign
racial preference in employment (or admissions) should be considered a "suspect classification" in the language of equal protection theory, and therefore
subjected to strict scrutiny, or whether the less stringent rational basis test is
the appropriate one. (Since the Supreme Court has so far decided that sex is
not a strict suspect classification, as is race, the standard for employment cases
is all the more confused.) A recent New Jersey case found an employment quota
ordered by the state's division of civil rights to be a violation of the state's
constitution. Lige v. Town of Montclair, 72 N.J. 5, 367 A.2d 833 (1976). The
upcoming decision in Bakke may have wide-ranging consequences for preferential remedies for employment discrimination. See generally Brest note 7 supra;
Edward & Zanetsky, PreferentialRemedies for Employment Discrimination,74
MICH. L. REv. 1 (1975); Ginsberg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L.
REv. 1 (1975); Karst & Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal Protection, 60
VA. L. REv. 955 (1974); Note,. Constitutionalityof Remedial Minority Preferences in Employment, 56 MINN. L. Rav. 842 (1972); Comment, Reverse Discrimination: The Balancingof Human Rights, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 852 (1976).
32. E.g., United States v. Elevator Constructors Local 5, 538 F.2d 1012 (3d
Cir. 1976). The court in that case remarked that a constitutional challenge to
membership goals and referral quotas was "foreclosed by the settled law of this
circuit." Id. at 1018.
33. See notes 26-28 supra.
34. Seniority rights were a subject of specific concern. Senator Clark
placed two interpretive memos in the record, both explicitly stating that exist-
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theless, the overwhelming weight of authority has come down on
the side of allowing remedial preferences on the ground that Congress' limitation of preferential treatment and its protection of
seniority were not intended to restrict the courts' broad equitable
powers to fashion effective relief for past discriminatory acts. 5
Courts have also refused to find that collective bargaining
agreements are a bar to preferential remedies." They have
pointed out that seniority provides a worker with expectations,
not vested rights, 3 and that earlier precedent had already established that these expectations might legally be altered by subsequent bargaining38 or in the interests of overriding national pol9
icy.

This rapidly increasing body of precedent validating the use
of preferential remedies was implicitly approved by Congress in
the 1972 amendments to Title Vll. ° Further, in 1973 and 1974,
ing seniority systems would remain undisturbed by the Act. 110 CONG. REC.
7207, 7213 (1964). Similarly, Senator Humphrey assured the body that seniority
rights would not be destroyed by Title VII. 110 CONG. REC. 6549 (1964). See
generally EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY note 12 supra.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Electrical Workers Local 38, 428 F.2d 144
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970); United States v. Local 189, United
Papermakers, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970);
EEOC v. AT&T, 419 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (and authorities cited
therein). Section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provided: "The court may
enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and
order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay ......
42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(g) (1970). In 1972 Congress strengthened the mandate further by adding
"or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." Id. § 2000e-5(g)
(Supp. V 1975).
Affirmative action plans under Executive Order No. 11,246, supra note 10,
have been vindicated on similar grounds. See, e.g., Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971).
36. E.g., Acha v. Beame, 531 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1976); Savannah Printing
Specialties, Local 604 v. Union Camp Corp., 350 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Ga. 1972).
37. E.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 663 (2d
Cir. 1971) (and authorities cited therein).
38. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Pellicer v.
Board of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 217 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S.
912 (1955).
39. See, e.g., Tilton v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 376 U.S. 169 (1964) (veterans'
preference).
40. See note 35 supra.
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the government successfully negotiated far-reaching nationwide
settlements with AT&T and the steel industry that received judicial approval and that were likely to have at least some impact
on employment practices in key areas of the economy. 1 Affirmative action appeared to have a firm legal foundation, though its
effect on the lives of minority and female workers and job seekers
42
was less than clear.
III.

MISGIVINGS

Despite this widespread approval of the legal foundation for
preferential remedies, courts have frequently been reluctant to
invoke them. The Second Circuit has described its own approach
as "gingerly,"' 3 and its attitude is not completely untypical."
Even when willing to invoke these remedies, courts often try to
limit them in duration and in scope. Quotas are usually seen as
temporary expedients" to be employed only long enough to
achieve some more rightful balance, at which time they should
be promptly discontinued, 8 in the belief that this balance will
maintain itself, or that any imbalance that occurs thereafter will
be a "natural" one, not the result of discrimination. 7
41. See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976) (preliminary print); EEOC v. AT&T,
419 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1976). See generally Kilberg, Current Civil Rights
Problems in the Collective Bargaining Process: The Bethlehem and AT.&T
Experiences, 27 VAND. L. REv. 81 (1974).
42. See note 2 supra.
43. Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 1340 (2d Cir. 1973), subsequent appeal, 497 F.2d 1113
(2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975).
44. See generally Slate, PreferentialRelief in Employment Discrimination
Cases, 5 Loy. CHI. L.J. 315 (1974); Comment, Hiring Goals, California State
Government and Title VII, 8 PAC. L.J. 49 (1977).
45. See, e.g., Vulcan Soc'y v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir.
1973).
46. Commentators who support benign preferences have also stressed the
importance of limitations. See, e.g., Davidson, Preferential Treatment and
Equal Opportunity, 55 ORE. L. REv. 53 (1953).
47. The validity of this assumption is certainly open to question, especially in a period of economic decline and given the fact that gross disadvantages
are still borne by many minority members in society at large. In a time of high
unemployment and stiff competition for available jobs, it may be unrealistic to
think that ending discrimination is a one-shot affair. (Determining when one has
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One court, for instance, has refused to impose remedial quotas when proof of prior discrimination was incomplete; 8 another
removed a quota when the defendants produced arguably credible alternative selection procedures;" one diluted "absolute" hiring preferences to ratios;W5 and another allowed a hiring quota
while rejecting one for promotions, in order to minimize the impact on the whites' expectations." Courts have almost uniformly
refused to allow actual displacement, or "bumping," of majority
incumbents. 2 Few distinctions have been consistently applied,
and no single coherent notion concerning the proper scope of preference has emerged. A nearly universal theme running through
the cases, however, has been the search for limiting principles to
contain what the courts seem to fear is a potentially explosive
remedy, both jurisprudentially and socially.
One approach that courts have taken in this search for limits
has centered around defining the proper class of people to whom
Title VII remedies should apply. Since its passage, there has been
a question as to whether Title VII creates rights for groups or for
individuals. On the one hand, sexual or racial discrimination can
be viewed as a class-wide injury that deserves class-wide relief.
Under this theory, remedies can run unreservedly to members of
erased the discriminatory past, even assuming the discrimination is truly past,
appears to be about as harrowing a task as assessing when one has achieved a
"unitary school system" under a school desegregation plan, and is thereby entitled to relax.) On the other hand, a permanent, federally-administered caste
system does not seem to offer an ultimate solution to our deep-rooted and
continuing problems of racism and sexism.
48. Kirkland v. New York Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420,
rehearingdenied (en banc), 531 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823
(1976) (preliminary print).
49. E.g., United States v. City of Chicago, 420 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Ill.
1976). But see Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 13 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. 1217
(9th Cir. 1976), in which Judge Tuttle was less sanguine about proposed new
selection procedures.
50. Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950
(1972).
51. Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973), subsequent appeal, 497 F.2d 1113 (2d
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975). But see Bolden v. Pennsylvania
State Police, 73 F.R.D. 370 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
52. See, e.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976) (preliminary print) (and authorities
cited therein).
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the group discriminated against, without regard to whether a
particular individual can show that the defendant discriminated
against him or her personally. Many courts have in fact awarded
remedies of this type." For instance, the imposition of hiring
quotas is fairly common and seldom hinges on whether a given
preferred applicant has been wrongfully rejected by the defendant in the past." There must, however, be a finding of discrimination by the defendant against someone, or there is no claim
upon which relief can be granted. 5 Some consent decrees have
involved large sca]e reordering of seniority and promotion rights
without requiring proof of past individual injury by beneficiaries." The Fifth Circuit has held that class-wide relief is particularly appropriate in "pattern or practice suits.""
Many courts, however, are reluctant to award class-wide relief, and seem to be reaching toward a standard of the
"identifiability" of the beneficiary as one possible limiting principle in the design of Title VII remedies." In Watkins v. United
53. See, e.g., Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 950 (1972); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir.
1971).
54. See, e.g., Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); United States
v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).
55. A showing of some prior discrimination may be crucial in a court's
decision on voluntary affirmative action plans. See, e.g., Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. La. 1976) (voluntary preferences
in collective bargaining agreement struck down); Brunetti v. City of Berkeley,
12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 937 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (voluntary affirmative action by
school board held violative of Title VII); cf. Myers v. Gilman Paper Corp., 544
F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1977) (voluntary preferences in collective bargaining agreement viewed as legitimate). But see Germann v. Kipp, 429 F. Supp. 1323 (1977)
(upholding voluntary affirmative action plan for public employees).
56. See note 37 supra. There is some evidence that courts are more liberal
in approving remedies worked out in a consent settlement than otherwise. Query
whether the majority workers feel any better about it just because their boss (or
union) negotiated it. See Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 514
F.2d 767 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911 (1975) (preliminary print).
57. The Attorney General, and later the EEOC itself, was authorized by
Title VII to bring "pattern or practice" suits designed to challenge big pacesetting violators. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See United
States v. TIME-DC, Inc., 517 F.2d 299, 319 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded sub. nom., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 97 S. Ct.
1843 (1977).
58. See, e.g., Stevenson v. International Paper Co., 516 F.2d 103, 118 (5th
Cir. 1975); Thornton v. East T.ex. Motor Freight, 497 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1974).
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Steelworkers Local 2369,1' a case which posed the problem of the
"nonidentifiable" discriminatee in a particularly stark form, the
Fifth Circuit refused protection from layoffs to recently hired
black workers who could not have been past discriminatees because they were simply too young to have applied for work during
the employer's discriminatory period. Therefore the court reasoned that none of them could claim a "rightful place" beside the
older workers and that Title VII did not prohibit layoff by seniority, even though that process returned the plant to virtually allwhite status.
Although the Supreme Court has steadily approved most
Title VII remedies that it has reviewed, it has been careful to
limit that approval to preferences which run to "identifiable"
victims of past discrimination." How the Court will eventually
reconcile the underlying Title VII goal of eliminating job discrimination as a class-wide societal phenomenon' with its desire for
a containable remedy remains to be seen. As the instances of
glaringly illegal racial and sexual discrimination become more
isolated, the numbers of minority and female workers who can
point to a comfortably obvious, discrete instance of discrimination to give them "standing" under an identifiable victims rule
are likely to diminish. Yet they should still have a remedy, if they
are in fact being denied real opportunities. 2
A second focus courts have employed in the search for limits
on Title VII remedies has centered on the issue of equitable treatment for majority workers and job seekers whose interests may be
adversely affected by a preferential plan. The collision of interests
59. 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975).
60. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (preliminary print); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See generally International Bhd. of Teamsters
v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 1843, 1874 (1977).
61. Given this goal of Title VU1, it would seem that remedies under the
statute should look forward as well as backward and should be designed to help
eliminate future discrimination as much as to compensate the victim of a past
wrong.
62. See generally Affeldt, Title VII in the Federal Courts-Privateor Public Law, 14 VILL. L. Rv. 664 (1969); Brest note 7 supra; Karat & Horowitz,
Affirmative Action and Equal Protection,60 VA. L. REv. 955 (1974); Poplin, Fair
Employment in a Depressed Economy: The Layoff Problem, 23 U.C.L.A. L.
Rsv. 177 (1975).
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between "preferred" and "dispreferred" workers63 has become
sharper over the past several years as the economic recession has
heightened the competition for available jobs, inflicting heavier
consequences on those who lose a given conflict."
The Second Circuit seems to be in the process of refining a
standard to gauge when Title VII remedies favoring minorities or
women must yield to the interest of majority members. This standard also turns on "identifiability," but the focus here is on the
majority employees adversely affected by a preferential plan
rather than on the original discriminatee. The more individually
63. See note 7 supra.
64. The layoff situation is an especially painful instance of hard times
exacerbating the short term conflicts of interest between white and black and
male and female workers. The challenge to minority layoffs has been much
litigated but with no conclusive results. The circuit courts that have confronted
the question so far have declined to alter last-hired, first-fired layoff rules to
protect minorities and women in newly-opened jobs, at least when the workers
seeking the relief could not prove prior discrimination by the employer against
them personally. The Supreme Court remanded one of these cases, Jersey Cent.
Power & Light Co. v. EEOC, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded,
425 U.S. 987 (1976) (preliminary print), for reconsideration in light of its decision in Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (preliminary print).
See text accompanying notes 87-92 infra. Jersey Central had specifically found
it unnecessary to determine whether the workers to be laid off were deprived of
seniority because of specific discriminatory acts. It may be that Franks will
eventually be interpreted to mean that relief from layoffs will turn on the
"identifiability" of the claimant. One case, in which a district court had enjoined layoffs of recently hired policewomen, was remanded by the Sixth Circuit
with instructions to make individual determination of seniority status in light
of Franks. Schaefer v. Tannian, 538 F.2d 1234 (6th Cir. 1976), vacating and
remanding 394 F. Supp. 1136 (E.D. Mich. 1975); see Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3263 (U.S.
Oct. 5, 1976) (No. 76-344) (must show prior discrimination); Acha v. Beame, 531
F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1976) (policewoman who could prove prior discriminatory
rejection entitled to retroactive seniority protection from layoff); Watkins v.
United Steel Workers Local 2369, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975) (must show prior
discrimination); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976) (preliminary print) (seniority system bona
fide). See generally Poplin note 62 supra; Stacy, Title VII Seniority Remedies
in a Time of Economic Downturn, 28 VAND. L. REV. 487 (1975); Summers &
Love, Work Sharing as an Alternative to Layoffs by Seniority: Title VII Remedies in Recession, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 893 (1976); Note, Last Hired, First Fired:
Layoffs and Title VII, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1544 (1975); Comment, Last Hired, First
Fired: Discriminatory or Sacrosanct?, 80 DICK. L. REv. 747 (1976); 14 DUQ. L.
REv. 475 (1976).

19771

COMMENT

identifiable such majority employees are, the more reluctant the
court is to order a preferential remedy. In Bridgeport Guardians,
Inc. v. Members of the Civil Service Commission,5 the court
approved temporary hiring quotas for the Bridgeport police force
but rejected any quotas for promotion of minorities, primarily
because the class of disappointed white incumbents would be
more ascertainable than that of disappointed white applicants."
The court reasoned that the incumbents had more of a reliance
interest in their jobs, and further, that their disappointment if
passed over for an expected promotion might exacerbate racial
tensions on the force. The court suggested less disruptive ways of
increasing minority mobility, such as lessening time-in-grade requirements and reducing the weight given to seniority in promotion decisions.
This reasoning was refined in Kirkland v. New York Department of CorrectionalServices, 7 in which the court set up a twopronged test for the imposition of preferential quotas: first, there
must be a demonstrated pattern of long and clear-cut discrimination, and second, the adverse impact of the preference must not
be "identifiable.""' A year later in EEOC v. Local 638, Sheet
Metal Workers," the court applied the Kirkland test and refused
to order placement of a minority member on the union's joint
apprenticeship committee, because the replacement would have
required bumping an identifiable white member of the committee. Again in Chance v. Board of Examiners," the Second Circuit
refused to grant preferential seniority rights to protect minority
school supervisors from layoffs. Though relying primarily on layoff cases from other circuits,7 ' the court stressed that the group65. 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973), subsequent appeal, 497 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975).
66. Although the court did not stress this, it would also appear that the
original victims of discrimination in promotions are more ascertainable than the
victims of hiring discrimination, and therefore a less "drastic," more individually tailored remedy is available for the former and should be more favored by
the court.
67. 520 F.2d 420, rehearing denied (en bane), 531 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976) (preliminary print), noted in 22 WAYNE ST. L.
REv. 1263 (1976).
68. 520 F.2d at 427.
69. 532 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1976).
70. 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1976).
71. See note 64 supra.
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ings of supervisors whose seniority rights would be changed sometimes contained as few as two or three people, and that the impact on older white supervisors and on general morale would be
too great to countenance.
This identifiability test appears to be unfortunate in several
respects. Its one-dimensional approach (looking primarily at the
potential impact on incumbents) precludes the consideration of
other factors, such as the impact of a choice of "no remedy" on
minority representation in that workplace, or the importance of
a given job slot to overcoming significant employment barriers for
others. For instance, in Sheet Metal Workers, the court applied
a mechanical ascertainability test and concluded that it could not
order a black representative to replace a white incumbent on a
selection committee. The court would have been in a better position to evaluate the full implications of available remedies (presumably including expansion of the board) if it had considered
the special importance of a minority representative on such a
crucial "admissions" body of the union to the process of ending
future discrimination within that organization.
IV.

COST-SHARING APPROACH

Other courts, while voicing concern for the affected incumbents, have taken a more flexible approach, often looking for a
way to share the burden of paying for discrimination rather than
visiting it all on one party or the other. Sometimes rather than
flatly denying a preferential remedy, courts have remanded cases
back to a district level or sent the parties back to conference
directing the lower courts or the parties to consider more fully the
interests of an affected group or to discuss ways of spreading
costs." Some commentators have suggested work-sharing as an
alternative to racially or sexually disproportionate layoffs." There
have been no cases formally ordering an employer to institute
work-sharing. The cases imposing racial admission and referral
quotas on craft unions, however, have much the same effect, especially during an economic downturn, since the quotas make it
72. See, e.g., Mandujano v. Basic Vegetable Prods., Inc., 541 F.2d 832 (9th
Cir. 1976); United States v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 525 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir.
1975); Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 510 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975); Cox v. Allied
Chem. Corp., 382 F. Supp. 309 (M.D. La. 1974).
73. See Summers & Love note 64 supra.
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much more problematic for such unions to follow their usual practice of restricting the size of the work force in relation to available
jobs, and all members may end up working less. 4 The district
court in Watkins v. United Steel Workers Local 2369" tacitly
acknowledged this effect and decided to shift the burden from the
work force in that case to the employer by ordering reinstatement
of laid-off blacks to restore a previous ratio, but refusing to allow
white workers to be bumped to make way for them. All retained
workers were to continue getting full-time wages. Similarly, the
district court in Patterson v. American Tobacco Co. 7 provided
that some whites be bumped back to lower level jobs in favor of
blacks whose advancement had been wrongfully blocked, but ordered that white workers' wages be held to their previous level.
Both cases were reversed on appeal, because the preferences that
had been ordered in favor of blacks were seen as too extreme. But
the idea of shifting some costs to the employer is still viable. In
general it would appear that an approach toward remedies for
discrimination that focuses on the problem of cost allocation and
on which party or parties should most appropriately bear remedial costs would be useful and might help both to clarify policy
and to frame some standards for the imposition of remedial measures.77
Two recent Supreme Court decisions highlight the current
tension and uncertainty around affirmative action, pointing up
new possibilities for the use of the cost allocation approach discussed above, but also suggesting potential threats to the whole
notion of preferential remedies. McDonald u. Santa Fe Trail
74. See, e.g., Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 38, 501 F.2d 622
(2d Cir. 1974).
75. 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La. 1974), rev'd, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975).
76. 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 778 (E.D. Va. 1974), rev'd, 535 F.2d 257 (4th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976) (preliminary print).
77. For a decision that seemed to ignore this dimension when it might
have been relevant, see EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir.
1975), vacated, 97 S. Ct. 2669 (1977), in which the court granted seniority
carryover (which came largely at the expense of white fellow workers) to all
transferring blacks regardless of whether they had previously applied for transfer, but denied back pay (which would have come from the employer's pocket)
unless they could prove a previous application. This result was reached despite
the fact that the district court had found the company's actions so egregious and
intentional that it had imposed punitive damages.
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TransportationCo." held that Title VII and the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 (42 U.S.C. § 1981)"' prohibit racial discrimination against
whites. Although this result seems entirely logical and unassailable in the rare context in which a white person suffers true racial
discrimination unrelated to any redress for traditional discriminateesy it would be ironic, to say the least, if Title VII or section
1981 became weapons for the defense of entrenched racial" privilege." The language of the opinion in McDonald concerning the
coverage of whites under section 1981 is expansive, but the Court
explicitly reserved the question of whether either of the statutes
at issue would invalidate affirmative action programs or "benign"
(that is, remedial) preferences." Already, however, one state
court has relied partly on McDonald to strike down such a preference in medical school admissions. 4
If one goes behind the colorblind wording of Title VII, both
to the history that brought it forth and to its underlying policy,
it seems clear that traditionally oppressed groups have a different
claim upon that law than does the majority. As Paul Brest has
recently articulated," discrimination against a minority race (or,
one might add, against the subordinate sex) is pernicious because
it both stigmatizes the individual and has the cumulative effect
of denying group members a vast range of opportunities in every
78. 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (preliminary print).
79. All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce

contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
80. See, e.g., Spiess v. Itoh & Co., 408 F. Supp. 916 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
81. Section 1981 deals only with race, Title VII, of course, prohibits sex
discrimination as well and has been used by males to strike down illegitimate
gender-based bars to employment. See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442
F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
82. See Note, The Expanding Scope of Section t981: Assault on Private
Discriminationand a Cloud on Affirmative Action, 90 HARV. L. REv. 412 (1976).
83. 427 U.S. at 280 n,8 (preliminary print).
84. Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132
Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1098 (1977).
85. See Brest note 7 supra.
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sphere. Discrimination against a member of a dominant race or
sex, though potentially unjust, does not have this stigmatizing
and cumulative effect. On a very elementary level black is not
white.86 It would thus seem that a reasonable interpretation of
Title VII would rest on an understanding that it would not be
available as a weapon against legitimate affirmative action, that
its operation would be different for dominant groups than for
subordinated ones, but that it offers some protection to both.
The second recent Supreme Court case, Franks v.Bowman
Transportation Co., 7 approved a grant of constructive seniority
to an identifiable victim of race discrimination. Although plaintiff was awarded seniority dating from the time of his original
(wrongfully rejected) application for employment, many members of the Court found themselves as uncomfortable as their
brethren below about the impact of such a remedy on majority
incumbents. The majority opinion is firm, however, that such
concern does not destroy the necessity for remedial preferences.
Justice Brennan wrote that the "[d]enial of seniority relief to
identifiable victims of racial discrimination on the sole ground
that such relief diminishes the expectations of other, arguably
innocent, employees would if applied generally frustrate the central 'make-whole' objective of Title VII."''
86. Twelve years ago Robert Carter noted:
IDlebate about the wisdom of compensation, preferences, and even
benign quotas, insofar as Negroes are concerned, distorts and obscures
the basic problem that our society now faces and must resolve. Ours is
a racist social order ....
Today, newspapers are concentrating on what is called the "white
backlash" in reaction to the "Negro revolution." In short, the inference
from use of this terminology is that Negro progress has been so phenomenal that white people are beginning to react against it. The real facts
are that the so-called Negro revolution is merely a drastic break with
the traditional Negro image. No great improvements in the Negro's
status have yet been accomplished ...
I put the discussion of quota, preference and compensatory treatment in the same myth-making category. If we debate about these
questions, we can pretend that the problem of discrimination itself has
been solved.
R. CARTER, EQUALITY (1965), quoted in Edwards, supra note 2, at 620.
87. 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (preliminary print). See also Edwards, Author's
Note, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 623 (1976).
88. 424 U.S. at 774 (preliminary print).
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Concurring Justices Powell and Rehnquist, while admitting
that such remedies are sometimes necessary, expressed concern
for "innocent" employees, 9 and urged courts to consider more
carefully the equities on the white workers' side. They seemed to
be saying that if the impact would be very hard on the incumbent, the remedy should not be granted. This approach is problematic, though, since in most cases if the burden of losing the
scarce job or seniority would be hard on one, it would be equally
hard on the other. Recessional layoffs are perhaps the best example of this dilemma. As the harshness of the consequences increases, the equities on both sides increase. It would have been
helpful had Justices Powell and Rehnquist explained more fully
what they saw as relevant factors in the balancing process beyond
an instinctive distaste for "granting favors" to minority groups.
Chief Justice Burger, concurring, doubted that an award of
competitive seniority 0 could "ever" be equitable. He advocated
a kind of cost-sharing model in which the white worker retains his
seniority, and the minority worker who has proven discrimination
gets a monetary award from the employer.9 The trouble with this
approach, in which the original victim gets money but not the
job, although it does utilize a cost-sharing idea, is that it does
nothing to help rectify the substantive distortions in the racial
composition and interrelations of the wotk force.
The impulse toward protecting whites (and, by extension,
males) that is evidenced by the Franks dicta and the McDonald
case, together with Franks' affirmation of limited remedial preferences for minorities, reflects the unresolved tension over proper
remedies for employment discrimination. Franks does provide
support for some version of a cost-sharing approach, both in the
opinion of Chief Justice Burger and in that of Justice Brennan
who noted, "We are of the view, however, that the result which
89. It is somewhat ironic that the innocent white incumbent should make
such a strong debut in Franks,since the record from the court below showed that
"itihe apparent source of the resistance to change . . . was the unwillingness
of the white drivers to 'ride double' with blacks, to train them for the job or to
share bunk and shower facilities with them on the road." 495 F.2d at 411.
90. "Competitive seniority" is that seniority which determines the allocation of scarce benefits, such as promotions and protection from layoffs, among
competing employees. It is different from "benefit seniority," which is used to
compute earned noncompetitive benefits of the job.
91. 424 U.S. at 781 (preliminary print).
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we reach today . . .establishes that a sharing of the burden of

the past discrimination is presumptively necessary."" Justice
Brennan further planted an open-ended question about monetary
awards to victims of affirmative action. The Court seemed to be
issuing a broad invitation to lower courts to start experimenting
with such devices.
The invitation was soon accepted by Judge Gesell of the
Federal District Court for the District of Columbia in McAleer v.
AT&T. 3 Plaintiff, a male employee of AT&T, was passed over for
promotion in favor of a less-qualified junior female employee,
though by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement" he was
entitled to the vacancy. In promoting the woman ahead of plaintiff, the company had acted in compliance with a consent decree
embodying a comprehensive settlement negotiated by the company and the federal government and designed to remedy the
company's past discrimination against minorities and women.'
92. Id. at 777. In a footnote he had this to say:
In arguing that an award of the seniority relief established as presumptively necessary does nothing to place the burden of the past discrimination on the wrongdoer in most cases-the employer-the dissent of
necessity addresses issues not presently before the Court. Further remedial action by the district courts, having the effect of shifting to the
employer the burden of the past discrimination in respect to competitive status benefits, raises such issues as the possibility of an injunctive
"hold harmless" remedy respecting all affected employees in a layoff
situation, the possibility of an award of monetary damages (sometimes
designated "front pay") in favor of each employee and discriminatee
otherwise bearing the burden of the past discrimination, and the propriety of such further remedial action in instances wherein the union
has been adjudged a participant in the illegal conduct. Such issues are
not presented by the record before us, and we intimate no view regarding them.
Id. at 777 n.38 (citations omitted).
93. 416 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1976).
94. The plaintiff's union, Local 2350, Communications Workers of America, sought to join the action, claiming that the consent decree was invalid and
that AT&T's actions had interfered with the union's ability to represent and
protect its members under the collective bargaining agreement. The court dismissed the union's claims for lack of jurisdiction, finding that a challenge to the
decree was an impermissible collateral attack, and that even should the union
amend, it would be unable to bring an independent suit under Title VII or the
National Labor Relations Act.
95. The consent decree was entered in a federal district court in Pennsylvania by Judge Higgenbotham on January 18, 1973. He later described it as "the
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Plaintiff sought both damages and promotion.
After recounting the history behind the AT&T consent decree, 6 Judge Gesell pointed out that it was a final judgment by a
largest and most impressive civil rights settlement in the history of this nation."
EEOC v. AT&T, 365 F. Supp. 1105, 1108 (E.D. Pa. 1973). The text of the
consent decree and a later supplemental order can be found in 1 EMPL. PRAC.
GUIDE (CCH)
1860 (1973), and 8 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 431:73 (1973). Later
phases of that case are reported at 506 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1974), and 419 F. Supp.
1022 (E.D. Pa. 1976). For documentation of discrimination at AT&T, see EEOC
PrehearingAnalysis and Summary of Evidence, A Unique Competence: A
Study of Equal Employment Opportunity in the Bell System, Docket No. 19143
(1972), reprinted in 118 CONG. REc. 4507-36 (1972).
96. Negotiations and implementation of the consent decree had truly been
a massive undertaking. In December 1970, the EEOC had attempted with various private groups to intervene in an FCC hearing on AT&T's rates. The FCC
denied the intervention in the rate proceeding but agreed to schedule a separate
adversary hearing on the question of employment discrimination. After a year
of investigation and informal negotiations, proceedings began in January 1972,
and lasted for over a year, with 60 days of hearings. (The major union at AT&T,
the Communications Workers of America (CWA), was consulted during this
time and was asked to participate formally in the proceedings, but declined.)
Finally, in January 1973, an agreement was reached between the government
and AT&T. The administrative judge in the FCC proceedings suspended the
hearing to allow for settlement. On January 18, suit was filed in federal district
court against AT&T for violation of Title VII, Executive Order No. 11,246, note
10 supra, and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970), and the
consent decree was entered the same day. It was to remain in effect for six years,
the court retaining jurisdiction during that period to monitor compliance and
order appropriate modifications. CWA then tried to intervene as a plaintiff in
the proceedings to enjoin implementation of the decree pending separate negotiations between it and the company. EEOC v. AT&T, 365 F. Supp. 1105 (E.D.
Pa. 1973). After an appeal to the Third Circuit, CWA was allowed to intervene
as defendant along with several other unions. EEOC v. AT&T, 506 F.2d 735 (3d
Cir. 1974). Its attempt to win modification of the decree failed. EEOC v. AT&T,
419 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
The substance of the consent decree was far-reaching. William J. Kilberg,
then Solicitor of Labor, says that the remedies were designed to compensate
groups of women and minorities who had been unlawfully rejected for employment, wrongfully assigned or refused transfer, and promoted to craft jobs but
paid an inferior wage. Kiiberg, Current Civil Rights Problems in the Collective
Bargaining Process: The Bethlehem and AT&T Experiences, 27 VAND. L. Rv.
81, 92 (1974). Some major provisions included: goals for hiring and promotion
of women and minorities in all jobs, hiring goals for male operators, back pay
for women paid less than men for equivalent work, lowered threshold of skill and
seniority requirements for competition for entry-level craft jobs, all tests to be
validated as job-related, special opportunities and training for management-
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sister federal court and therefore not subject to his review. For
that reason he said he could not entertain the proffered arguments going to the overall validity of the affirmative action plan.
He went on to hold, however, that McAleer had suffered a clear
case of Title VII sex discrimination, that an action to recover for
that violation was not a collateral attack on the consent decree,
and that the court therefore had jurisdiction to decide the Title
VII claim. Then, relying on Franks, Judge Gesell held that in
addition to being a member of a class protected by the consent
decree, the promoted woman was a victim of discrimination and
had a legitimate claim on the vacancy. McAleer could not therefore prevail on his demand for the promotion. Nevertheless,
Judge Gesell noted that both the majority and minority opinions
in Franks had urged courts to "attempt to protect innocent employees by placing this burden [of eradicating past discrimination] on the wrongdoing employer whenever possible." 7 The
court ruled that AT&T would have to help bear the burden. Since
McAleer had apparently shown that he would have been promoted but for the affirmative action program, he was entitled to
damages on a "rough justice" basis. The court noted tangentially
level jobs for female college graduates in the system (unusual because Title VII
remedies have seldom been imposed beyond the blue-collar level), publicity to
all employees, and lump sum restitution of $100-400 to 10,000 women and minorities eventually promoted to craft jobs to compensate them for delay (also
an unprecedented remedy). Id. at 93-94.
Naturally enough, this plan led to significant alteration of expectations.
The shock experienced by many Bell customers at hearing a male voice say,
"Can I help you?" was only the tip of the iceberg. The company reported that
in 1973-74, it had resorted to use of the "affirmative action override" (leapfrogging women and minorities into vacancies for which they were qualified in
order to meet goals) in 28,886 out of 112,518 hirings and promotions. EEOC v.
AT&T, 419 F. Supp. 1022, 1051 (E.D. Pa. 1976). By July 1975, the union reported that several thousand grievances had already been filed by disgruntled
incumbents and 57 had been approved for arbitration. Four cases already arbitrated had resulted in awards for the union. Id. at 1055. Various suits were filed
challenging the decree. See, e.g., Federation of Tel. Workers v. Bell Tel. Co.,
406 F. Supp. 1201 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd, 546 F.2d 415 (3rd Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 1651 (1977) (promotions not arbitrable); Taterka v. Wisconsin
Tel. Co., 394 F. Supp. 862 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (action by rejected white off-thestreet applicant dismissed for failure to state a claim). Meanwhile, intended
beneficiaries of the consent decree could point to the fact that many goals were
not being met. EEOC v. AT&T, 419 F. Supp. 1022, 1034 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
97. 416 F. Supp. 435, 439 (D.D.C. 1976).
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that this cost should accrue to AT&T's stockholders?8
The decision in McAleer is in some ways most noteworthy for
what it does not say. Judge Gesell awarded a novel remedy using
a cost allocation approach that has much to commend it, but the
opinion either ignored or glossed over many of the stickiest problems. For instance, the court held that Title VII provides a cause
of action to a male employee whose seniority expectations have
been disrupted by a judicially decreed remedial program." This
was a holding of major import, and one that could impede or halt
the use of preferential remedies for victims of employment discrimination.' o' It answered a question that the Supreme Court
expressly reserved in McDonald.' Yet Judge Gesell reached his
conclusion in three sentences: "It is undisputed that plaintiff
McAleer would have been promoted but for his gender. This is a
classic case of sex discrimination within the meaning of the
[Civil Rights Act] . . . .That much is clear." Even if one agreed
that that much was clear, it would be helpful to know why the
court thought so." 2
A second major problem with the case concerns its procedural posture. Judge Gesell acknowledged that the consent decree
was a valid and binding judgment, "not subject to review or
modification in any other court."' 03 Particularly since the federal
district court in Pennsylvania still retained jurisdiction over the
decree, this seems an appropriate conclusion. Analogous cases
have reached the same result, holding that the proper vehicle for
challenge of an ongoing consent decree is intervention in the original action, a direct approach to the rendering and supervising
court.' Yet Judge Gesell went on to take jurisdiction of the plain98.

Id. at 440.

99. Compare McAleer with Hefner v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 14
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 826 (E.D. La. Mar. 14, 1977) (Franksrequires that impact
on dispreferred be extreme before it is remediable).
100. See notes 78-86 supra and accompanying text.
101. 427 U.S. 273, 280 n.8 (preliminary print). See text accompanying
note 83 supra.
102. Aside from the more substantive issues involved, the court did not
even mention whether or not McAleer met the normal jurisdictional requirements for an individual Title VII suit (filing of charges with the EEOC, receipt
of a notice of right to sue, and timely filing thereafter). See, e.g., McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
103. 416 F.Supp. at 438.
104. See Martini v. Republic Steel Corp., 532 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1976);
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tiffs claim, noting that it did "not in any way impugn or collaterally attack the judgment in [the Pennsylvania] case."'0 5 This
statement appears a little disingenuous, given the potential impact of such a remedy on AT&T's liability under the affirmative
action plan, if it were widely approved.
True, a reasonably equitable resolution of the procedural
problem in a case like the AT&T consent decree is a delicate
proposition. The varied, conflicting, and farflung interests involved in such an action can be truly staggering.'"1 Similarly, the
inventiveness of interested parties in their search for legal and
extralegal tools to aid in their attempts to modify, block, or enforce the decrees appears boundless.0 7 The judge's task in adminOburn v. Shapp, 521 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 97 S.Ct. 1650 (1977);
Black & White Children v. School Dist., 464 F.2d 1030 (6th Cir. 1972); Construction Indus. Combined Comm. v. Operating Eng'rs, Local 513, 67 F.R.D. 664
(E.D. Mo. 1975). But cf. Leisner v. New York Tel. Co., 358 F. Supp. 359
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (retaining jurisdiction over suit already pending when decree
was entered and granting greater relief). See also United States v. AlleghenyLudlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826, 838 n.9 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944
(1976) (preliminary print).
105. 416 F. Supp. at 438.
106. Judge Thornberry, in reviewing the district court's entry of the steel
industry consent decree, noted:
At the time of the decrees' entry, hundreds of employment discrimination charges were pending against the [defendant steel companies and
the union] before the EEOC and federal district courts scattered
throughout the country. Between twenty and sixty thousand minority
and female individuals then stood beneath the overlapping umbrellas
of these charges as members of putative aggrieved classes in actions
seeking systemic injunctive relief and back pay. Thousands still do,
and the problems of administrative and judicial management are truly
awesome.
United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826, 836 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976) (preliminary print).
107. Aside from the regular EEOC mechanisms, the wide range of methods used in attempting to attack, modify, influence, or extend judicial orders of
affirmative action plans include: (1) appeal from the original decree; see, e.g.,
Mandujano v. Basic Vegetable Prods., Inc., 541 F.2d 832 (9th Cir, 1976) (by
some of the plaintiffs); Watkins v. Steel Workers Local 2369, 518 F.2d 41 (5th
Cir. 1975) (by defendant); (2) intervention; see, e.g., United States v. AlleghenyLudlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976)
(preliminary print) (by outside feminist group and aggrieved minorities and
women); Firebird Soc'y v. Board of Fire Comm'rs, 66 F.R.D. 457 (D. Conn. 1975)
(by ad hoc group of white firemen); Mack v. General Elec. Co., 63 F.R.D. 368
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istering such an action is far from easy.'0 8 But the difficulties of
the problem-most centrally, how to make sure all interests are
adequately represented,101 while at the same time providing a
judgment that can be relied upon by the parties with at least
some measure of certainty-merit a more careful treatment than
they received from the court in McAleer. Judge Gesell did point
(E.D. Pa. 1974) (by union); (3) use of grievance procedure; see, e.g., EEOC v.
AT&T, 419 F. Supp. 1022, 1055 (E.D. Pa. 1976); (4) suit to compel arbitration
pursuant to the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970); see,
e.g., Savannah Printing Specialties, Local 604 v. Union Camp Corp., 350 F.
Supp. 632 (S.D. Ga. 1972); (5) suit to enforce arbitration award; see, e.g., Federation of Tel. Workers v. Bell Tel. Co., 406 F. Supp. 1201 (E.D. Pa. 1975); (6)
separate suit to enjoin the decree; see note 94 supra; (7) separate suit by beneficiary of plan for further relief; see, e.g., Leisner v. New York Tel. Co., 358 F.
Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); see also Williamson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 468
F.2d 1201 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973); (8) declaratory
judgment action by employer; see, e.g., Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v.
EEOC, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated, 425 U.S. 987 (1976) (preliminary
print); (9) suit against union under Landrum-Griffin Act, 29 U.S.C. § 411
(1970); see, e.g., Gavin v. Iron Workers, Local 1, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1137
(N.D. 111. 1975); (10) claim by employer against union for contribution; see, e.g.,
Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 59 F.R.D. 267 (E.D. Va. 1973), furtherproceedings,
375 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429
U.S. 125 (1976) (preliminary print); (11) motion by employer to dismiss for
failure to join dispreferred whites as indispensable parties; see, e.g., English v.
Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 465 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1972); (12) self-help by unions;
see, e.g., United States v. Elevator Constructors Local 5, 538 F.2d 1012 (3d Cir.
1976) (protest strike when black worker not laid off in order of his seniority);
(13) self-help by employers; see, e.g., Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1974) (foot-dragging); (14) suit under
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), for access to compliance
reports; see, e.g., United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 13 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 376 (D.D.C. 1976). This list is not exhaustive and the attempts have
met varied fates. It does, however, give some idea of the complexity of the
situation and the parade of potential liabilities that no doubt keep some management and labor lawyers awake at night.
108. For a provocative appraisal of the problems and possibilities in this
new type of complex public law litigation, see Chayes, The Role of the Judge in
Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976). For a judicial plea for relief
on the same subject, see McGowan, Congress and the Courts, 62 A.B.A. J. 1588
(1976).
109. Truly "adequate representation" in this situation is clearly as much
a matter of politics and economics as it is of court rules. Still, the procedure
developed will make some difference to interested parties and to their ability to
have their concerns weighed in the judicial balance.

1977]

COMMENT

out the harshness of a rule that would require all aggrieved parties
to travel to one location to litigate their claims, and that is certainly a legitimate concern."0 It is not clear, however, that it is
weighty enough to justify the taking of jurisdiction in this case,
at least without a more extended discussion of the implications
and alternatives. 1 ' In fact, subsequent to the McAleer decision,
the judge who had issued the consent decree, explicitly disapproved of Judge Gesell's remedy, remarking, "Title VII recognizes
narrow but nevertheless real and complete immunity for employer conduct undertaken in good faith reliance on a written
interpretation or opinion of the EEOC."" 2 By implication, he
regarded the decision in McAleer as at least potentially disruptive.1 3
A third bothersome aspect of the McAleer opinion is the
absence of any explanation of what plaintiff must showmabout his
situation to be entitled to relief. This goes to the problem of
identifiability. The court did say, "rolf course, only that employee who would have been promoted but for the affirmative
action program is entitled to recovery.""' But nowhere does the
court explain how McAleer had demonstrated this. It appears
that the parties did not dispute McAleer's claim to the promotion, and this may be why the court treated it as a given. However, in light of the fact that promotion policy at AT&T was
apparently never governed absolutely by seniority, but allowed
110. This concern is apparently not fully shared by the Fifth Circuit. In
United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976) (preliminary print), the court noted that resort to
the internal mechanisms set up to monitor the steel industry consent decree
would have been a more convenient method than intervention "for employees
who reside at a distance from the Northern District of Alabama," thus implying
that grievances arising out of the consent decree, if litigated, should be addressed to the rendering court. Id. at 838 n.9.
111. It seems at least possible, for instance, that judges in future nationwide suits affecting the rights of thousands of employees and job-seekers might
arrange for local hearings as part of the factfinding process, or demand that
federal agencies involved develop some kinds of due process standards for dealing with both preferred and dispreferred employees.
112. EEOC v, AT&T, 419 F. Supp. 1022, 1055 n.34 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
113. See also Note, The Expanding Scope of Section 1981: Assault on
Private Discrimination and a Cloud on Affirmative Action, 90 HARV. L. REv.
412, 447 n.210 (1976) (remarks on McAleer).
114. 416 F. Supp. at 440.
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the exercise of some management discretion,1 3 and that promotions in at least one AT&T collective bargaining agreement were
specifically declared to be nonarbitrable,"' it would have been
helpful to know what standard of proof the court thought was
appropriate, and where the cutoff point on liability should fall,
even if by way of dictum. How identifiable a victim has to be to
claim the McAleer remedy is a key question, one yet unresolved," 7 but one upon which the court shed no light.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Despite the weaknesses of the opinion in McAleer, it may
perform a service in forthrightly responding to the Supreme
Court's hints in Franks and in getting this damages remedy out
on the table."" Its basic cost allocation approach, counting the
employer in as a cost bearer, is also salutary. The question of
damages for dispreferred employees could better be considered in
other procedural contexts, perhaps when a court is originally
trying to fashion a remedial Title VII decree or being asked to
approve a negotiated settlement rather than in a separate proceeding as was involved in McA leer. Such relief would not run the
risk of inconsistent results or disruptive effects in relation to an
ongoing decree.' Perhaps more importantly, it could be applied
as simply one way of assuring an affirmative action plan as fair
as possible to all, and it would be the remedy most likely to
provide a program upon which black and white, male and female
workers could unite. It would not have to be based on a finding
that the nonpreferred or dispreferred workers had an independent
Title VII claim themselves, a finding that could pave the way for
Title VII to dig its own grave. Rather it would be part of the
general restitutional relief demanded from the employer for the
115,
116,

EEOC v. AT&T, 419 F. Supp. 1022, 1037 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
Federation of Tel. Workers v. Bell Tel. Co., 406 F. Supp. 1201 (E.D.

Pa. 1975),

117. See text accompanying notes 53-62 supra.
118. In fact one gets the feeling that this is just what Judge Gesell was
doing. It looks as though he was not particularly interested in finding the perfect
case or building a careful logic for his holding but wanted simply to express the
basic policy.
119. Additionally, it would avoid running into the problem (not treated
in this comment) of whether an employer under court order should be granted
immunity for acting in compliance therewith. See 416 F. Supp. at 440.
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original act of discrimination. The scheme could be applied liberally on a class-wide basis for all those whose relative competitive
seniority would be impaired by the impact of a preferential remedy, irrespective of whether they could show a particular benefit
foregone at the present time. Ways of computing average future
value of seniority are designable. All this would appear to be
within the range of the legally possible at present.
Of course, there are likely to be significant practical obstacles to such an approach, especially if it were broadly applied.
The most obvious problem is economic. The area in which seniority may be the most crucial of all, that is, job security against
layoff, is often the very situation in which many employers are
least able to pay restitutional damages. The district court in
Watkins v. Steel Workers Local 2369,1' 1 for instance, granted a
remedy that shifted the costs to the employer, ordering that
blacks be reinstated and whites be kept on as well-both at fulltime pay. One wonders when the employer had had to lay off such
a big percentage of its work force, whether it could have absorbed
further labor costs or (what may be more to the point) whether
most courts would have been willing to require it to do so.
Another practical question about such a remedy is who
would pay for it in the long run. Although this is a key question
which both springs from and shapes our basic policy orientation
on the whole issue of ending and remedying discrimination, it is
one which courts will be reluctant and probably ill-equipped to
address directly. Judge Gesell indicated that the cost would have
to be absorbed out of profits, but it is hard to see how this could
be enforced in most cases, and further, whether courts would
try.' Enterprises often pass along costs, and they would surely
attempt to do so in this case. Even with a pass-through of costs,
120. 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La. 1974), rev'd, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975).
121. Judge Gesell cited NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662 (1976), which held
that the FPC had no duty to issue and enforce regulations prohibiting the
practice of employment discrimination by the industries it regulates. However,
the court also noted that the FPC did have a duty to make certain that any costs
from such practices were not passed along to consumers. At least for regulated
industries, such as AT&T, this would foreclose one way for the company to
simply pass along costs. The employer would, however, still have the option of
deducting the costs from the wages of his workers as a whole during the next
round of collective bargaining, and unregulated industries could simply raise
prices.
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this remedy arguably would avoid placing an undue burden on a
small group of somewhat arbitrarily penalized individuals and
require society as a whole to bear the cost. Payment by "society
as a whole," though, would, as always, be harder to bear for those
with lower incomes, thus disproportionately burdening the class
that may have had least benefit from or power over the mechanisms of discrimination. It would thus be preferable to take the
cost out of profits. But as noted above, the mechanism and the
will to do so are not readily at hand. The realities of a depressed
economy make it even more unlikely that many courts would
openly involve themselves in the underlying economics of this
cost allocation remedy.
At any rate, it is to be hoped that the weight of the McAleer
decision will be felt in its insistence on the importance of opening
jobs to minorities and women, coupled with a refusal to allow
disproportionate costs to be visited directly upon white and/or
male fellow workers, when the wrongdoing employer can be made
to help bear the burden. It does not constitute strong authority,
and should not be taken as such, for the proposition that disadvantages experienced by members of the dominant groups as a
result of legitimate, reasonably equitable affirmative action programs, constitute the kind of discrimination that Title VII will
prohibit.
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